THE RELATION OF PATENTS TO THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
GE oRGE E. FoLK*

Is there a clash of principles between the United States patent system, which
grants an unconditional monopoly of an invention, and the system of free compedtive enterprise, which it is a policy of the antitrust laws to uphold? I believe there is
not.

There should be no special difficulty in reconciling our patent laws with our antitrust laws. The courts have readily defined their respective spheres by "recognizing
the nature of the property dealt in."' While private ownership of property, including patent property, is essentially a limitation of the activities of others, it is also
true that under our system of free enterprise private ownership and complete control
of the property involved not only promote free enterprise but are essential to it.
It is not the ownership or control of property-the monopoly thereof-whether
it be patents or other property rights, that the antitrust laws are aimed at, but at
abuses of those rights. Free enterprise does not mean that anyone should be free to
conduct an enterprise with another's property without the other's permission.
Whenever a person enters into a contract which covers something beyond the
rights inherent in the patent grant, the transaction, of course, is subject to the general
law and the patent affords no immunity.
ACT
The Sherman Antitrust Law was enacted in 18902 and has for its objective a
curb, beyond that of the common law, upon monopolies resulting in unreasonable
restraint of interstate and foreign trade. The ownership and control of any kind of
property is a monopoly of that property, whether it be real estate or personal property
-whether, for example, it be the ownership of lands resulting from land grants
by the Government or whether it be patentable inventions covered by a patent.
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OBE cnrIvs or THE PATENT LAWS

In the Constitution our forefathers provided for the development of our geographical frontiers by providing that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States . . ."'

Exercising this power, Congress passed laws

by which land patents were granted
Such a land patent vested title to the land in
perpetuity in the grantee. At the same time, in order to encourage the discovery
and development of scientific frontiers, our forefathers provided in the Constitution
that Congress should have power to "promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to . . .inventors the exclusive right to their . . . dis-

coveries."'
Thus a land patent grants a property right (a monopoly) in perpetuity, while a
patent for an invention grants a property right (a monopoly) for a limited time only
-at first for fourteen, now for seventeen years.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, to quote the exact words in one instance,
that "a patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right
rests upon the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same
sanctions."'

A patent, therefore, is a monopoly in the same sense that the ownership and
control of any property is a monopoly. There was no occasion in the antitrust laws
to specify patents as an exception to the application of those laws. There is no
reason for assuming that patents are an exception. However, at times the courts
have made such statements as: ".

.

. a patent is an exception to the general rule

'7
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market.

THE "Ruiz OF REASON"

Obviously, a literal application of the language of the Sherman Act would
seriously hamper interstate and foreign trade. Therefore, the Supreme Court has
applied "the rule of reason" in interpreting the statute; i.e., it inquires whether the
restraint of trade is reasonable or unreasonable. Even before the rule of reason was
used as a guide, the Supreme Court had held that the Sherman Act "dearly does not
refer to that kind of restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or licensee of a patent by the
owner thereof, restricting the terms upon which the article may be used and the
price to be demanded therefor.:"
'U.

S. CONS?. Art. IV,

§3(2).

'REV. STAT. §453 (1875), 43 U. S. C. §2 (1940).
'U. S. CONST. Art. 1, §8(8).
8 Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92, 96 (1876).
See also James v. Campbell, 104
U. S. 356 (i88I); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178 (1933); and Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945).
'Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 8o6, 816

0 ' Bement
e945).
note i, at 92.
v. National Harrow Co., sulprat
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In an able early decision of one of our federal district courts it was stated that
"it seems self-evident that a contract which is only co-extensive with the monopoly
conferred by letters patent and which creates no additional restraint of trade or
monopoly, does not conflict with the Sherman Act."'
It becomes important, therefore, to understand fully the nature of the patent grant
and what is inherent in that grant.
In the half century that has elapsed since the passage of the Sherman Act, we
have decisions from our courts on patent agreements covering almost every conceivable state of facts. While there is no rule of thumb to apply, and while borderline cases arise which may cause one person in good faith to conclude that a particular patent agreement is legal and another person to conclude that it is illegal, there
are still definite answers to most questions that are likely to arise.
The following statement of the United States Supreme Court sets down the rule
about as definitely as it can be stated: ".... the rule is, with few exceptions, that
any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of
property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to
manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts."1 This was preceded by a statement that "the very object of these [patent] laws is monopoly, .. "11
In the same case, the Court
nature of the property dealt
Let us therefore examine
common rights and wrongs

called attention to the necessity of ".... recognizing the
in .. ."2 The failure to do so will result in confusion.
into the nature of the patent property and list the more
with respect thereto that have been determined.

NATURE OF THE PATENT GRANT

In the course of the last century our courts have at frequent intervals emphasized
the fundamental nature of the patent grant. They have not expressed any difference
of opinion on this subject, not even in the more recent Supreme Court decisions.
The right which the patent confers -consists solely in the right to exclude everyone except the patent owner from making, using, or vending the thing patented
without permission of the patentee. That is all that the patent confers. Any right
that the patentee himself may have to make, use, or sell his invention is a commonlaw right.
It is obvious that an inventor, whether or not he is granted a patent, has a right
in his own invention or discovery. That is, he has a common-law right in his
mental creation. At common law, however, he had no exclusive right, and the only
way in which he could prevent the appropriation of his discovery by others was to
conceal it. The patent supplements this common-law right by granting to the
patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or vending the invention.
' Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg Co., 166 Fed. 555, 557 (D. Mass. 1909).
10 Bement v. National Harrow Co., supra note 1, at 91.
1
bid.
'2 1d. at 93.
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That is what the Constitution means when it gives Congress the power to secure
to the inventor the exclusive right to his discovery-that is, the right to exclude
others for a limited period.
ERRONEous Vmws ExPIESSED

BY TnH

ANnTRuST DIvIsIoN OF

TBE DEPARTUMNT OF JUsTICE

The views just expressed regarding the nature and scope of tie patent monopoly
have not in recent years been willingly accepted by the United States Department
of Justice. Repeated prior rulings of the Supreme Court have been absolutely
ignored; and we find representatives of the Antitrust Division, in arguments before
the Supreme Court, in testimony given before congressional committees, and in
statements made before government investigating committees, expressing views as
to what the law is directly contrary to the accepted views. For example, compare
such statements of the Supreme Court as that
rests on
a patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The 1right
3
the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions,
with statements emanating from the Department of Justice, such, for example, as:
There may be some doubt, hqwever, whether patents are the 14kind of "prbperty'"
included within the constitutional requirement for just compensation;
and also,
I mean there may be some question at to whether the taking of a patent is the taking of
property within the meaning of the Constitution.' 5
And again, the same spokesman raises the question whether a patent is "a property
right, or something that may be withdrawn."'"
We also find the Antitrust Division urging, in a brief field by the Department of
Justice as amicus curiae in the Talking Pictures case,' 7 the novel theory that:
If a patent grant is limited to its proper orbit ... the scope of the rights of the patentee
will be the legal permission to make, use and vend given by the statute to implement the
constitutional provisions...
In the simpler economy in which the notion of the patent was born, the usual patent
monopoly was nothing more than the exclusive right to produce for a limited period of
years...

But if the rights of the patent owners are allowed to be extended beyond the privilege
to make, use and vend, the whole matter becomes confused ...

The controlling principle is that the patent privilege does not go beyond the privilege

"to make, use and vend.'
" See note 6 supra.

8

",Hearings before the Senate Committee on Patents on S.
is Id. at 34.
8

2303, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1942).

Ibid.
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U. S. 124 (1938).
In a brief filed by the Department of Justice as amicus curiae in General Talking Pictures Corp.
v. Western Electric Co., supra note 17.
1

18
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Furthermore, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Patents of the

Seventy-seventh Congress, a statement was made on behalf of the Antitrust Division
calculated to leave the impression that in the early days the inaccurate and unsub-

stantiated views quoted above expressed the correct basic principles, from which the
Supreme Court later incorrectly strayed. For example, we have a statement from
the Antitrust Division as follows:
The first patent law interpreted "exclusive right" to mean an exclusive right to produce
or use the invention... ' This meant giving a monopoly of production for a limited
time.
No authority was or can be cited in support of such statement.
Thus we find advanced by those in responsible positions in the Department of
Justice certain astounding and revolutionary views regarding patents. These
erroneous views are, in the main: (i) that a patent merely grants to the inventor
"permission" to make, use, and sell the new thing invented by him; (2) that the
grant of any limited form of license, incorrectly called a "restrictive" license, is
outside any right inherent in a patent; and (3) that patents do not represent property rights such as the United States Constitution undertakes to protect. These are
concepts wholly different from those that have frpm the very first universally prevailed, up to and including the most recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
These erroneous views have been set forth because they are essential to an understanding of why the Supreme Court has taken such pains to reassert at some length
in recent decisions the nature and scope of the patent monopoly, and especially the
rights which the patentee has in general with reference to the grant of limited, or
so-called "restrictive," licenses.
LICENSE

REsICTIONs

IN GENERAL

The inherent right to specify certain restrictions in patent licenses was early
recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court said in Gayler v. Wilder:
The monopoly did not exist at common law, and the rights, therefore, which may be
exercised under it cannot be regulated by the rules of the common law.20
A leading case involving license restrictions is Bement v. National Harrow Company, in which is found the following statement:
... the general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws
of the United States. The very object of those laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few
exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to
this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right
to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts.21
In the same case, the Court further stated, referring to the Sherman Antitrust Act,
that it
19
20

Hearings, supra note 14, at 627.
o0 How. 477, 494 (U. S. 1850).

21 x8

6

U. S. 70, 91 (19o2)..
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... clearly does not refer to that kind of a restraint of interstate commerce which may
arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or licensee of a
the terms upon which the article may be used
patent by the owner thereof, restricting
22
and the price to be demanded therefor.
Another case of interest, because it was the first in which the Supreme Court
was called on to consider the above-mentioned arguments of the Government, is
General Talking Pictures Corporation v. Western Electric CompanyP In that
case, after the Supreme Court had made its decision, the Government asked permission to intervene as amicus curiae upon rehearing. Permission was granted. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, said:
That a restrictive license is legal seems clear.... As was said in United States v. General
Electric Company, 272 U. S. 476, 489, the patentee may grant a license "upon any
condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee
by grant of the patent is entitled to secure. ... ." The practice of granting licenses for2a4
restrictive use is an old one ... So far as appears, its legality has never been questioned.
Similarly, in more recent decisions, down to the current ones, we find the
Supreme Court in agreement upon such statements of the law, as will be seen by
subsequent reference to those decisions. There seems to have been no question
in the minds of the justices as to the established law and its application to the facts,
though the Court split on the question of the remedy that should be applied where
violations of the law were found to exist.
RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT GRANT

There are a number of restrictions or limitations which it is well recognized that
a patentee may place on a license to another in the exercise of his rights under a
patent. These will be briefly referred to.
I. Royalty. In general, the patentee may fix any terms of royalty he chooses.
2. Sale price. The patentee may grant a license to manufacture and to sell only
at prices fixed by the patentee. 5 When there are a number of licensees, the patentee
may fix uniform prices for the various licenses as a condition of the waiver of his
exclusive rights.
Such price fixing must be based, however, on the belief that the patent is valid,
and a patent must not be used as a mere subterfuge for price fixing. Nor can the
licensees use the patent as an excuse for agreeing among themselves to fix prices.
Also, so long as the patentee, who himself manufactures, retains tide to the
articles which he manufactures under the patent, his patent rights permit him to
fix the price at which his distributors (del credere agents) may sell the article. There
is no violation of the antitrust laws in fixing the price at which such agents shall sell
to the consumer.

Is1d.

25

at 92.

23305 U. S. 124 (1938).

United States v. General Electric Co.,

272

U. S. 476 (1926).

24
1d. at 127.
For extremely important recent

holdings on this subject, see the Line Material and the Gypsum cases, infra.
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3. Quantity. The patentee may, in the license, limit the quantity or the percentage of the total output to be manufactured by the licensee.
4. Territorial licenses. The statutes provide that the patentee may assign his
rights under his patent for a specified territory.2 6 Likewise, he may grant licenses,
exclusive or non-exclusive, for a given territory. He may even limit the use to the
licensee's own factory or place of business.
5. Number of licensees. The patentee can determine for himself the persons,
one or more, whom he will license. The mere fact that it may be his general policy
to issue licenses does not obligate him to grant licenses to all comers. The patent
owner may license or refuse to license as he sees fit.
6. Field of use or purpose for which the license is granted. The patentee may
grant licenses restricted to a particular field or fields of use, or for some particular
purpose or purposes.
These are the more general forms of limited or restricted licenses which the courts
recognize as valid by virtue of rights accruing to the patentee from the grant of
his patent.
RESTICTIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PATENT

Having pointed out some of the kinds of restricted or limited licenses that are
within the rights granted by a patent, I shall next consider some of the restrictions
which the courts have held to be outside the scope of a patent.
In the first place, the Supreme Court has uniformly held that, after the unrestricted sale of a patented article by the patentee, or by a licensee having unqualified
rights to make the sale, the article is freed from the monopoly of the patent and
an agreement with respect to subsequent control cannot be justified by the fact that
the article is covered by a patent 2 In other words, the article, after such sale, moves
outside the patent monopoly. In applying the old doctrine that, after sale of a
patented article, the patent on it can no longer control the use of that article, the
Supreme Court has gone so far as to state that such is the case irrespective of the fact
that the use to be made of the article sold is itself covered by still another patent.
Once having sold an article for its intended use, the patent owner has lost control
of further use of such article. 8
There are certain restrictive agreements, properly so-called, which do not find
justification by virtue of patent ownership. Among these may be mentioned: (I)
Resale price maintenance; (2) agreement of a patent owner not to use his own
invention, or to restrict his own use, in the absence of a complete transfer of his
patent rights to another; (3) agreement to use only supplies furnished by the patent
owner in connection with an article sold or leased by the patentee; and (4) agree28

REv. STAT. §4898 (1875), 35 U. S. C. §47 (1940).
"TDr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1gx).

28

See Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States and United States v. Univis Lens Co., hnfra.
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ments in general not to deal in the goods, wares, or merchandise of a competitor.
Such agreements, as well as methods of conducting business, outside the patent
monopoly should be scanned with care to determine whether they are likely to result
in unreasonably lessening competition or in restraint of trade in interstate or foreign
commerce, and thereby violate the antitrust laws. Also, in general, care should be
taken that the patent is not being used contrary to the public interest. The courts
have even gone so far as to consider attempts to use the patent for such purposes as a
misuse thereof, even though there is no violation of the antitrust laws. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court are to the effect that in such cases the patentee will
be refused relief against infringement.
In short, it may be said the recent trend is to apply the antitrust laws mos~t
stringently, or even to consider with care whether, aside from violation of the antitrust laws, a use of the patent against the public interest is involved.29
In general, it may be said that whether patent agreements involving "restrictions"
run afoul of the antitrust laws depends upon the nature of the agreements, and
primarily upon whether the restraints are within the four corners of the right to
restrain granted by the patent, or are restraints resulting from agreements extending
beyond the patent monopoly, even though dealing incidentally with the patent property as a subject of contract.
AGGREGATION OF PATENTS UNDER A SINGLE CONTROL

Many of the decisions which have been referred to have dealt with instances in
which a number of patents were brought under a single control either by crosslicensing or by pooling. In this connection, two questions arise: (I) To what extent
may "non-competing" or "supplementary" patents be acquired legally by purchase or
consolidation to strengthen a commercial position? and (2) the same question where
the patents are "competing" patents-that is, patents representing alternative products or methods. An instance of the consolidation of "non-competing" or "supplementary" patents is found in United States v. Winslow,"0 in which it was held that
the union in one corporation of three different companies, each manufacturing
under a different "non-competing" group of patented machines, collectively used for
making shoes, is not forbidden by the Sherman Act, although a large percentage of
the shoe-machinery business may thus be put in a single hand. 3'
The second question, concerning the right by purchase or merger to bring under
the same control "competing" patents previously held by adverse interests, does not
seem to have been before the Supreme Court as often as might be expected. Of
course, such combinations would be subject to careful scrutiny by the courts to
ascertain the reasonableness of any restraint which might arise. The Gasoline
29 See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co. and B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, infra.
so
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U. S. 202 (1913).

s'For an opinion with substantially the same effect but by a divided court, see the first Shoe
Machinery case, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32 (1x8).
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Cracking case2 presents a variety of interesting questions on this subject worthy of
detailed consideration. In that case there were four main defendants, each owning

its own patents for processes used in gasoline cracking. There were forty-six
secondary defendants who were manufacturing under licenses from the main defendants. In all, some seventy-nine contracts had been entered into.
No fundamental patent was involved. Nevertheless, litigation had arisen and

still more was threatened. As a result, the parties entered into the agreement complained of. The agreement provided that each main defendant might secure licenses
under the patents of the others, together with the right to issue sub-licenses. The
contract also provided for fixed royalties, all of which were to be divided according
to a fixed plan.
The Court in this case found that there was no unreasonable restriction of
competition; that the amount of gasoline produced by the parties to the contract
was only about 26 per cent of the total gasoline production; and that there was no
proof that the defendants could, by reason of their contract, fix the market price of
gasoline.
In short, the Court found that no additional monopoly of any kind and no
restraint of interstate commerce had been effected by means of the contract.
The subject of accumulating patents by purchase, the pooling of patents, crosslicensing agreements, acquisition of improvement patents, etc., cannot be gone into
fully within the limits of the present paper . 3 It should be borne in mind, however,
as has been stated, that the monopoly granted by patents does not exempt the
patentee from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. However, agreements reasonably necessary to protect the patent owner in the enjoyment of his patent rights are
not in conflict with the antitrust laws. The mere grant of licenses-i., the waiver
of exclusion-does not lessen competition or restrain trade, but quite the contrary,
and is not in conflict with the antitrust laws. Patents, however, may not be used as
a subterfuge for maintaining a monopolistic combination. This is well set forth in
Blount Manufacturing Company v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, wherein the Court stated:
It seems self-evident that a contract which is only coextensive with the monopoly
conferred by letters patent, and which creates no additional restraint of trade or monopoly,
does not conflict with the Sherman Act .... A contract whereby the manufacturers of

two independent patented inventions agree not to compete in the same commercial field
deprives the public of the benefits of competition, and creates a restraint of trade which
results, not from the granting of letters patent, but from agreement.3 4
REcENT SuPREME COURT DECISIONS

I have discussed the time-honored decisions of the Supreme Court with reference

to the scope of the patent monopoly. I have mentioned the divergent views that the
2
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931).
"sFor a decision dealin'g with the acquisition of improvement patents and possible dangers involved,
see Transparent-Wrap Madhine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., infra.
at 166 Fed. 555, 557 (D. Mass. 19o9).
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Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has urged. I shall now refer to the
more recent decisions of the Supreme Court in a chronological, case-by-case method
to determine to what extent the Supreme Court has reaffirmed previous holdings and
to what extent, if at all, it has expressed departures from those holdings. A study
of these decisions discloses that there has been no departure from the established
view regarding the rights which a patentee acquires; that the courts will deal
harshly with "misuse!' of patents even where there is no violation of antitrust laws,
having thrown aside precedents; and that decrees may be expected which in effect
wholly or partially confiscate patent property.
The General Talking Pictures caseY5 This case reaffirms the right of a patentee
to grant restricted licenses, and holds that, where a license is restricted to a particular
field or purpose of use, one who knowing the fact purchases the apparatus from
the licensee and uses it in other fields is an infringer. On this latter point there
was a dissenting opinion.
Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States.3 6 In this case the rights of a
patentee and the limits of those rights are stated at some length. Ethyl, after the
sale of its product, was attempting through other patents to control jobbers' pricesin effect trying to control resale prices. The Court stated:
[The situation] is one in which appellant has established the marketing of the
patented fuel in vast amounts on a nationwide scale through the xi,ooo jobbers and at the

same time, by the leverage of its licensing contracts resting on the fulcrum of its patents,
it has built up a combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling

jobbers' prices and suppressing competition among them.

7

Morton Salt Company v. G. S. Suppiger Company. 8 This was a suit brought
for an injunction and an accounting for the infringement of a patent on a machine
for depositing salt tablets.
The Court found that the patentee was making use of its patent monopoly to
restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles (salt tablets) for use
with the patented machine, and was thus creating a limited monopoly not within
that created by the patent. The Court stated:
It is a principle of general application that courts, and especially courts of equity, may
appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to
the public interest.
Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to
entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear

that the improper practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse
of the patent have been dissipatedYa9
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Clayton Act had been
violated.
25305 U.

31

S. 124 (1938).

ld. at 457.
"Id. at 492, 493.

-

309 U. S. 436 (1940).
314

U. S. 488 (1942).
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B. B. Chemical Company v. Ellis ° This whs a companion case to the Morton
Salt Company case, and the decision of the Court was to the same effect, stating:
It will be appropriate to consider petitioner's right to relief when it is able to show that
it has fully abandoned its present method of restraining competition in the sale of un41
patented articles and that the consequences of that practice have been fully dissipated.
United States v. Univis Lens Company.42 This case is similar in some respects
to the Ethyl case. It holds that one who sells a patented product in its uncompleted
form, for further development, cannot rely on other patents relating to subsequent
treatment to control prices. He has parted with his control of the product. He has
parted with any monopoly that patents can confer.
United States v. Masonite Corporation.43 In this case a number of corporations
were each engaged either in manufacturing or in selling building materials. All
maintained selling organizations and to a large extent competed in the same markets.
Some had competing patents, others did not. Under the agreements, Masonite
designated the other parties as "agents" and appointed them to sell Masonite products. Masonite fixed the minimum selling prices of such "agents." Furthermore,
Masonite agreed to adhere to the prices and conditions which it fixed for those
agents, thus binding itself to a condition outside the scope of its patents, since the
patent gives the patent owner no right to agree to exclude himself. The Court
found that there was no genuine agency involved, and hence the case did not come
within the ruling of the General Electric case. The holding was to the effect that
in turning over its products to its so-called agents, the Masonite company parted
with its right to any further control; that when the patenied product "passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly"; that he
then has, so far as the Sherman Act is concerned, no greater right to price maintenance than the owner of the unpatented commodity would have. The Court
went to some length in reasserting the scope and limits of the patent monopoly.
Sola Electric Company v. Jefierson Electric Company.Y This case involved a
patent license contract which provided that the licensee, on sales of licensed transformers throughout the United States, should conform to the prices fixed by licensor
for the sale of competing patented articles by other licensees and by the licensor. The
Gourt stated:
Such a restriction on the price of articles entering interstate commerce is a violation of
the Sherman Act save only as it is within the protection of a lawfully granted patent
monopoly...
and therefore,
. . . petitioner may assert the illegality of the price-fixing agreement and may offer any
' ld. at 498.
"3P6 U. S. 265 (1942).

o34 U. S. 495 (1942).
42316 U. S. 241 (1942).

"United States v. General Electric Co.,
&
"317
U. S. 173 (1942).

272 U.

S. 476 (1926).
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evidence to establish its illegality, including proof of the invalidity of the
competent
46
patent.
The Glass Industry case.47 The Court went to some length in reaffirming old
principles and was unanimous in finding violation of the Sherman Act. Not even
in the dissenting opinions was any disagreement expressed with respect to the
fundamental concepts of the patent system. Only with respect to the nature of the
decree was there dissent. The dissents refer to "a ... misconception, that men who
have misused their property, and acquired much of it, by violating the Sherman Act,
are free for the future to continue using it as are other owners who have committed

no such offense."

48

Precision Izratrument Manufaaruring Company v. Automotive Mantenance
Machinery Company.49 "The guiding doctrine in this case," the Court stated, "is the
equitable maxim that 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands."'
Continuing, the Court said:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by the
Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting
the "Progress of Science and Useful Arts." At the same time, a patent is an exception
to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open
market.50
s1
Edward Katzinger Company v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Company
and MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company."2 The question here is whether the defendant, in a suit to recover royalties only under a patent
license agreement containing price-fixing provisions, can challenge the validity of
the patent despite a covenant in the license contract that he would not do so.
The Court held that it can, with four of the justices in a strong dissent.
Transparent-Wrap Machine Corporation v. Stokes & Smith Company. 3 The
provision of the agreement around which the controversy turned was a covenant to
assign improvement patents. With respect thereto, the Court stated:
An improvement patent, like the basic patent to which it relates, is a legalized monopoly
for a limited period. The law permits both to be bought and sold. One who uses one
patent to acquire another is not extending his patent monopoly to articles -governed by
the general law and as respects which neither monopolies nor restraints of trade are
sanctioned. He is indeed using one legalized monopoly to acquire another legalized
monopoly.
It is true that for some purposes the owner of a patent is under disabilities with which
owners of other property are not burdened. Thus where the use of unpatented materials
is tied to the use of a patent, a court will not lend its aid to enforce the agreement though
control of the unpatented article falls short of a prohibited restraint of trade or monopoly.
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., supra. There is a suggestion that the same course
01d. at 175, x77.
's1d. at 440, 441

al329

U. S. 394 (947).

"Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945).
"Utd. at 814, 816.
,9 324 U. S. 8o6 (1945)..
as329 U. S. 402 (1947)

5329 U. S. 637 (1947).
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should be followed in this case since the tendency of the practice we have here would be
in the direction of concentration of economic power that might run counter to the policy
of the anti-trust laws. The difficulty is that Congress has not made illegal the acquisition
of improvement patents by the owner of a basic patent. The assignment of patents is
indeed sanctioned. And, as we have said, there is no difference in the policy of the
assignment statute whatever consideration may be used to purchase the improvement
patents. And apart from violations of the anti-trust laws to which we will shortly advert,
the end result is the same whether the owner of a basic patent uses a license to obtain
improvement patents or uses the wealth which he accumulates by exploiting his basic
patent for that purpose. In sum, a patent license may not be used coercively to exact a
condition contrary to public policy. But what falls within the terms of the assignment
statute is plainly not per se against the public interest.
We are quite aware of the possibilities of abuse in the practice of licensing a patent on
condition that the licensee assign all improvement patents to the licensor. Conceivably
the device could be employed with the purpose or effect of violating the anti-trust laws.
He who acquires two patents acquires a double monopoly. As patents are added to
patents a whole industry may be regimented. The owner of a basic patent might thus
perpetuate his control over an industry long after the basic patent expired. Competitors
might be eliminated and an industrial monopoly perfected and maintained. Through the
use of patent pools or multiple licensing agreements the fruits of invention of an
entire industry might be systematically funneled into the hands of the original patentee.
See United Shoe Machinery Co. v. La Chapelle, 2x2 Mass. 467, 99 N. E. 289.
Congress, however, has made no specific prohibition against conditioning a patent license
on the assignment by the licensee of improvement patents. But that does not mean that the
practice we have here has immunity under the anti-trust laws. Indeed, the recent case of
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S.386.. , 324 U. S. 570 ,. ., dramatically
illustrates how the use of a condition or covenant in a patent license that the licensee will
assign improvement patents may give rise to violations of the anti-trust laws.
We only hold that the inclusion in the license of the condition requiring the licensee
4
to assign improvement patents is not per se illegal and unenforceable.
There were dissenting opinions, in -one of which it is stated: "... . the Court's
decision in this case unduly enlarges the scope of patent monopolies and is incon-

sistent with the philosophy enunciated in Mercoid Corporation v.Mid-Continent
U. S. 66I . ..and similar cases." 55
United States v. National Lead CompanyY0 This case presents a so-called "in-
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ternational cartel" dating back to 192o, at which time the National Lead Company
entered into an agreement with foreign companies by which the world markets were
divided, even in some cases where there were no patents in certain of those countries.
Later, in 1933, the du Pont Company, a potential competitor, entered to a greater or
lesser extent into the combination.
Whether or not the original agreement by the National Lead Company was a
'

5

Id. at 644, 645, 646, 647, 648.

Id. at 648.
5867 Sup. Ct. x634 (U. S. 1947).
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violation of the antitrust law was the first issue presented. The second issue was with
respect to the later participation of the du Pont Company in such combinations in
1933, the question being whether the latter company had succeeded in avoiding not
only the form but also the substance of the transgression.
Still a third issue was whether the contract between National Lead and du
Pont was offensive to the antitrust laws apart from the relation of that contract and
the parties thereto to foreign producers.
The validity of none of the hundreds of patents involved had been litigated.
The Court laid stress on the fact that a new industry had been created for
titanium products and that this new industry had been dominated because of
the agreements entered into. On the question of violation of the anitrust laws
there was no difference of opinion; the Court found that there had been a violation
thereof. Referring to the special conditions in the case, the Supreme Court found:
These findings disclose the special conditions which confronted the District Court in

framing its decree. They disclose a vigorous, comparatively young, but comparatively
large, world-wide industry in which two great companies, National Lead and du Pont,
now control approximately 9o% of the domestic production in substantially equal shares.
The balance of that production is in the hands of two smaller companies. Each of these

is affiliated with larger organizations, not parties to this case. The findings show vigorous
and apparently profitable competition on the part of each of the four producers, including

an intimation that the smaller companies are gaining ground rather than losing it. Keen
competition has existed both before and after the elimination, by the 1933 agreement and
57
understanding, of certain patent advantages from among the weapons of competition.
There was no difference of opinion regarding the question of violation of the
antitrust laws. There was, however, a dissenting opinion with respect to the proper
remedy which should be applied in order to grant effective relief.
The decision of the Court, a lengthy one, is of importance as a pronouncement
upon international agreements, a subject upon which there was little prior authoritative statement.

International Salt Company, Inc. v. United States. 8 The Government brought
this civil action to enjoin the International Salt Company from carrying out the
provisions of its leases of its patented machines to the effect that the lessee would use
therein International's salt products, which were unpatented goods.

The Court stated:
Under the law, agreements are forbidden which "tend to create a monopoly," and it is
immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full
gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the direction of the
movement.

Of course a lessor may impose on a lessee reasonable restrictions designed in good
Rules
faith to minimize maintenance burdens and to assure satisfactory operations ....
"'Id. at 1647.
rs 68 Sup. C.

12

(U. S. 1947).
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for use of leased machinery must not be disguised restraints of free competition, though
they may set reasonable standards which all suppliers must meetY9
On this main issue there was no dissent, though on the matter of the remedy
that should be applied there was a dissenting opinion in which is the statement:
"Agreeing wholeheartedly with the Court's opinion on the main issue, I am left
unpersuaded. . ."o with respect to the nature of the decree directed to be entered.
United States v.U. S. Gypsum Company." This case involved license agreements in which a minimum sale price was provided for.
The Court was unanimous in holding that the instant case presented a violation
of the antitrust laws, and distinguished it from the decision of the Court in the
General Electric case.
The decision is a voluminous one, and the principal question involved may be
gathered from the following quotation from the opinion:
The General Electric case affords no cloak for the course of conduct revealed in the
voluminous record in this case. That case gives no support for a patentee, acting in
concert with all members of an industry, to issue substantially identical licenses to all
members of the industry under the terms of which the industry is completely regimented,
the production of competitive unpatented products suppressed, a class of distributors
squeezed out, and prices on unpatented products stabilized. We apply the "rule of
reason" of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. x, . . . to efforts
to monopolize through patents as well as in non-patent fields. Even in the absence of the
specific abuses in this case, which fall within the traditional prohibitions of the Sherman
Act, it would be sufficient to show that the defendants, constituting all former competitors
in an entire industry, had acted in concert to restrain commerce in an entire industry under
patent licenses in order to organize the industry and stabilize prices. That conclusion
follows despite the assumed legality of each separate patent license, for it is familiar
doctrine that lawful acts may become unlawful when taken in concert. Such concerted
action is an effective deterrent to competition; ...The rewards which flow to the patentee
and his licensees from the suppression of competition through the regulation of an
industry are not reasonably and normally adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the
patentee's monopoly.6 2
One feature of the case not necessary to the decision is of interest because the
Court stated that in an antitrust suit the Government should have the right to
challenge the validity of patents involved. From this view Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
while concurring in the main decision, expressly dissented, stating:
In Part II of the opinion the Court confessedly deals with an issue that "need not be
decided to dispose of this case." Deliberate dicta, I had supposed, should be deliberately
avoided. Especially should we avoid passing gratuitously on an important issue of public
law where due consideration of it has been crowded out by complicated and elaborate
issues that have to be decided. Accordingly, I join in the Court's opinion, except Part 11.03
United States v. Line Material Company." The opinion of the Supreme Court
in this case was rendered by Mr. Justice Reed. The Court found that the respondent
"Id at

15,

16.

8

Id. at i8.

6168 Sup. Ct. 525 (U. S. 1948).

-Id.

'3 Id. at 548.

6L68 Sup. Ct. 55o (U. S. 1948).

at 544-545.
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had been guilty of violating the antitrust laws by sales price restrictions in license
contracts.
The question for decision was whether, in the light of the prohibition of the
Sherman Act, two or more patentees in the same patent field may legally combine
their patent monopolies so as to control the sale price of the patented devices, manufactured under both groups of patents.
The two patents involved were a Lemmon patent issued to the Southern States
Equipment Corporation and a Schultz patent assigned to the Line Material Company. As a result of an interference in the Patent Office, broad claims were issued in
the Lemmon patent and narrower claims in the Schultz patent. The Court recognized the fact that "only when both patents could be lawfully used by a single
maker could the public or the patentees obtain the full benefit of the efficiency and
economy of the inventions."" Because of this, Southern granted a license to Line
with a provision by which it could issue licenses to others, Line agreeing to sell
equipment covered by the Southern patent at prices not less than those fixed by
Southern. Southern made the same agreement for equipment covered solely by the
Line patent. Thereafter, Line issued a number of licenses to others containing the
sales price limitation feature.
The Government attacked the rationale of the General Electric case and urged
that is be overruled or differentiated. Mr. Justice Reed stated that he himself accepted the rule in the General Electric case, but pointed out that the instant case
could not be decided on that basis, since on the question of the right of a patentee
to fix sale price restrictions in a license, the Court was equally divided, four of the
justices upholding the opinion in the General Electric case and four others, though
concurring in the view that in the case in question there was a violation of the
antitrust laws, taking the further view that the General Electric case should be

overruled. In the Court's opinion it is stated:
Where a patentee undertakes to exploit his patent by price fixing through agreements with
anyone, he must give consideration to the limitations of the Sherman Act on such action.
The patent statutes give an exclusive right to the patentee to make, use, and vend and to
assign any interest in this monopoly to others. The General Electric case construes that
as giving a right to a patentee to license another to make and vend at a fixed price. There
is no suggestion in the patent statutes of authority to combine with other patent owners to
fix prices on articles covered by the respective patents. As the Sherman Act prohibits
agreements to fix prices, any arrangement between patentees runs afoul of that prohibition
and is outside the patent monopoly. 6
In short, the Court held that the combination of different patentees for the purpose of fixing the sale prices was unlawful under the Sherman Act and that others
who subsequently enter into license agreements with price-fixing provisions with
knowledge of the contract are equally subject to the prohibition of the antitrust laws.
YSd.
at 553.
'AId. at 563.
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Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Murphy, and Mr.
Justice Rutledge joined, while concurring in the Court's opinion, stated flatly, "I
would be rid of United States v. General Electric Co.," and in his concurring
67
opinion he gives his reasons for that position.

Mr. Justice Burton, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion as to the violation of the antitrust laws, and at
great length set forth the reasons why the decision in the General Electric case
should apply to the instant case.
Thus it appears that on the question of overruling the opinion in the General
Electric case the Court was divided four to four, one of the justices taking no part
in the consideration of the case.
6TId.

at 565.

